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I. INTRODUCTION 
On November 2, 2010, voters in Iowa fired three of the Iowa 
Supreme Court’s seven justices.1  Under constitutional reforms that 
Iowans had adopted nearly half a century earlier, each of those justices 
had been appointed by the state’s governor from a list of names supplied 
by the state’s judicial nominating commission,2 but then was required to 
stand for a retention vote after a short initial period of service and every 
eight years thereafter.3  Chief Justice Marsha Ternus had been appointed 
to the state’s high court by Republican Governor Terry Branstad in 1993 
and was on the November 2010 ballot seeking her third eight-year term; 
Justice Michael Streit had been appointed by Democratic Governor Tom 
Vilsack in 2001 and was seeking his second eight-year term; and Justice 
David Baker had been appointed by Democratic Governor Chet Culver 
in 2008 and was seeking his first eight-year term.4  Under ordinary 
circumstances, each of those justices would have been virtually 
guaranteed success on Election Day.  Since Iowa moved from an 
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 1. See A.G. Sulzberger, In Iowa, Voters Oust Judges Over Marriage Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
3, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/03/us/politics/03judges.html. 
 2. See IOWA CONST. art. V, §§ 15–16. 
 3. See id. § 17.  After first being placed on the court, a justice “serve[s] for one year after 
appointment and until the first day of January following the next judicial election after the expiration 
of such year.”  Id.  The justice must then survive a retention vote if he or she wishes to serve a full 
eight-year term.  See id.  At the completion of that eight-year term, and every eight years thereafter, 
the justice may remain on the court so long as he or she survives his or her periodic retention votes.  
See id. 
 4. Grant Schulte, Iowans Dismiss Three Justices, DES MOINES REG., Nov. 3, 2010, at A1.  
Provided they wish to continue to serve, Justice David Wiggins will be up for retention in 2012 and 
Justices Mark Cady, Daryl Hecht, and Brent Appel will be up for retention in 2016.  Id. 
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election-driven method of choosing justices5 to a merit-selection and 
retention system in 1962, no Iowa Supreme Court justice had ever failed 
to survive a retention vote.6  Indeed, in the nearly seventy-five years 
since California became the first state to hold a judicial retention 
election, voters nationwide had refused to allow only eight other state 
supreme court justices to keep their seats.7 
In 2010, however, the circumstances were far from ordinary.  In 
Varnum v. Brien,8 decided in April 2009, Chief Justice Ternus, Justice 
Streit, and Justice Baker joined with their colleagues in unanimously 
holding that the state’s ban on same-sex marriage violated the equality 
clause of the Iowa Constitution.9  Social conservatives in Iowa vowed to 
strike back by removing each of the three justices whose names were 
slated to appear on the November 2010 ballot.10  Buoyed by financial and 
political support from out-of-state opponents of same-sex marriage,11 
those efforts found their mark.  In an election that drew the largest 
number of ballots cast in any midterm election in the state’s history,12 
                                                     
 5. See IOWA CONST. art. V, § 3 (repealed 1962) (“The Judges of the Supreme Court shall be 
elected by the qualified electors of the State . . . .”). 
 6. Schulte, supra note 4, at A1. 
 7. See Grant Schulte, Remaining Four Justices Could Face Ouster Efforts, DES MOINES REG., 
Nov. 6, 2010, at A1.  For the story of five of those non-retained justices, see B. Michael Dann & 
Randall M. Hansen, Judicial Retention Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1429, 1431–36 (2001) 
(describing events of non-retention in California, Tennessee, and Nebraska).  A study of the period 
from 1964 to 1998 found that in the 4558 judicial retention elections held nationwide for state judges 
representing all levels of the judicial hierarchy, only fifty-two judges and justices had not been 
retained.  Larry Aspin, Trends in Judicial Retention Elections, 1964–1998, 83 JUDICATURE 79, 79 
(1999).  The study also found that during that same approximate period, the mean percentage vote in 
Iowa in support of retaining judges and justices ranged from 73.7 to 84.4 percent.  Id. at 80. 
 8. 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
 9. Id. at 872 (“[W]e hold the Iowa marriage statute violates the equal protection clause of the 
Iowa Constitution.”); see also IOWA CONST. art. I, § 6 (“All laws of a general nature shall have a 
uniform operation; the General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, 
privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens.”); 
IOWA CODE § 595.2(1) (2009) (“Only a marriage between a male and a female is valid.”), 
invalidated by Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 862.  Iowa thereby became the fourth state in which a 
supreme court has struck down a ban on same-sex marriage on state constitutional grounds.  See In 
re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. 
art. I, § 7.5; Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding Proposition 8 
unconstitutional); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Goodridge v. 
Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).  Courts in several other states have upheld their 
states’ bans on same-sex marriage.  See Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007); Hernandez v. 
Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006); Standhardt 
v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). 
 10. See infra Part III. 
 11. See infra notes 81–84 and accompanying text. 
 12. See Jason Clayworth, Midterm Vote Saw Record Turnout, DES MOINES REG., Nov. 30, 
2010, at B1 (reporting that 1,133,434 ballots were cast, exceeding the prior record by approximately 
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voters rejected the three justices’ bids to remain on the court.13  One 
leader of the ouster campaign declared that Iowa’s voters had done 
“‘God’s will by standing up to the three judges who would try to redefine 
God’s institution and say that marriage is anything other than one man 
and one woman.’”14  Another leader of the campaign joyously predicted 
that the election results would “‘send a message across the country that 
the power resides with the people.’”15  Supporters held signs declaring, 
“‘It’s we the people, not we the courts.’”16 
Judging from national press reports17 and from remarks made by 
academics and judges during casual conversations at this mid-November 
Kansas symposium, Iowa was indeed the epicenter of tremors felt across 
the country.  Yet it is far from apparent precisely what those tremors 
portend.  If the three ousted justices had plainly flouted judicial norms, 
the lesson for jurists in Iowa and elsewhere would be clear: when the 
legal issues are sufficiently salient, citizens will take advantage of an 
opportunity to punish judges who violate the norms of their profession.  
What makes the Iowa experience so problematic is that, no matter what 
one’s political preferences might be on the issue of same-sex marriage, 
one who reads the Varnum opinion will find that the court’s reasoning 
fell well within the parameters of established methods of constitutional 
analysis.  The three justices did not lose their jobs by violating widely 
embraced conventions of constitutional reasoning.  Rather, they lost their 
jobs by reaching a conclusion that many citizens found morally and 
politically objectionable. 
To help make sense of what happened in Iowa and of what it could 
mean for jurisdictions nationwide, this paper will describe the path from 
                                                                                                                       
62,000). 
 13. See IOWA SECRETARY OF STATE, OFFICIAL RESULTS REPORT (Nov. 29, 2010) [hereinafter 
OFFICIAL RESULTS REPORT], available at http://www.sos.state.ia.us/pdfs/elections/2010/ 
judicialorr.pdf (reporting vote totals indicating that voters denied Justice Baker’s and Justice Streit’s 
bids for retention by a margin of fifty-four to forty-six and denied Chief Justice Ternus’s bid for 
retention by a margin of fifty-five to forty-five). 
 14. Jason Hancock, Chuck Hurley: Ousting Iowa Supreme Court Justices Was ‘God’s Will,’ 
IOWA INDEP., Nov. 3, 2010, available at http://iowaindependent.com/46996/chuck-hurley-ousting-
iowa-supreme-court-justices-was-gods-will (quoting Chuck Hurley, president of the Iowa Family 
Policy Center). 
 15. Sulzberger, supra note 1 (quoting Bob Vander Plaats); see also infra Part III (discussing 
Vander Plaats’ role in the non-retention campaign). 
 16. Sulzberger, supra note 1. 
 17. For examples of national press reports describing the debate surrounding the removal of 
three Iowa Supreme Court justices, see Ben Birbaum, Setbacks in House, Optimism in States, WASH. 
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, at A5; Adam Cohen, Iowa Vote Shows the Injustice of Electing Judges, 
TIME.COM, Nov. 10, 2010, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2030526,00.html; 
Sulzberger, supra note 1. 
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Varnum to the three justices’ ouster, and then suggest a number of 
important lessons that one can draw from the experience. 
II. THE VARNUM OPINION 
Varnum v. Brien involved an action brought by Katherine Varnum 
and eleven other members of same-sex couples who had applied for 
marriage licenses in Polk County, Iowa.18  Timothy Brien, in his capacity 
as the Polk County Recorder, had denied those applications pursuant to 
the state’s ban on same-sex marriage.19  The Polk County District Court 
granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment,20 and the case 
moved directly to the Iowa Supreme Court on appeal.21 
The Iowa Supreme Court’s methodological approach to the 
constitutional question before it was far from novel—indeed, unanimity 
would have been difficult to achieve if one or more of the justices had 
insisted on deviating from interpretive norms.  If anything is remarkable 
about the form of the opinion itself, it is the great patience and clarity 
with which the court explained its reasoning.  Justice Mark Cady, the 
opinion’s author, seemed to go out of his way to walk through the 
analysis in a manner that an educated lay reader could easily understand.  
Perhaps with that very objective in mind, the court opted not to depend in 
any way on the doctrine of substantive due process—a doctrine on which 
the trial court had partially relied,22 but also a doctrine that is famously 
controversial for its lack of clear textual grounding and that is difficult to 
explain even in law school classrooms.  Instead, the Iowa Supreme Court 
relied entirely upon the equality clause of the Iowa Constitution, which 
reads: “All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation; the 
General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, 
privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms shall not equally 
belong to all citizens.”23  In determining the import of that provision in 
the case at hand, the court asked a series of familiar questions—questions  
                                                     
 18. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009). 
 19. Id. (citing IOWA CODE § 595.2(1) (2009)). 
 20. See id. at 872–74 (describing the district court proceedings). 
 21. See IOWA CODE § 602.4102(2) (permitting the supreme court to take a case directly from a 
district court and then decide whether to refer the case to the Iowa Court of Appeals). 
 22. See Varmun, 763 N.W.2d at 877 (“The district court concluded the statute was 
unconstitutional under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Iowa Constitution . . . .”). 
 23. IOWA CONST. art. I, § 6; see also id. § 1 (“All men and women are, by nature, free and 
equal . . . .”). 
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that, in state and federal jurisdictions across the country, rest at the heart 
of modern American equal-protection analysis. 
The Varnum court began by asking whether the statute classified 
individuals on any discernable basis.24  The statute’s language was 
straightforward: “Only a marriage between a male and a female is 
valid.”25  Defenders of the statute argued that it did not classify 
individuals at all—everyone, they said, was equally free to marry a 
person of the opposite sex.26  The justices acknowledged that the Iowa 
statute did not expressly mention sexual orientation, but nevertheless 
found a sexual-orientation classification lurking beneath the statute’s 
text: 
[T]he right of a gay or lesbian person under the marriage statute to 
enter into a civil marriage only with a person of the opposite sex is no 
right at all.  Under such a law, gay or lesbian individuals cannot 
simultaneously fulfill their deeply felt need for a committed personal 
relationship, as influenced by their sexual orientation, and gain the civil 
status and attendant benefits granted by the statute.  Instead, a gay or 
lesbian person can only gain the same rights under the statute as a 
heterosexual person by neglecting the very trait that defines gay and 
lesbian people as a class—their sexual orientation.27 
The court then sought to determine the appropriate standard of 
review for sexual-orientation classifications.28  Invoking the widely 
recognized criteria for making such determinations,29 the court found that 
some form of heightened scrutiny, rather than rational-basis review, was 
appropriate.  First, the court observed that “gay and lesbian people as a 
group have long been the victim of purposeful and invidious 
discrimination because of their sexual orientation.”30  Second, the court 
found that a person’s sexual orientation bears no relationship to his or her 
“ability to contribute to society,” and that classifications based on sexual 
orientation are thus likely to be “based on irrelevant stereotypes and 
                                                     
 24. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 885. 
 25. IOWA CODE § 595.2(1). 
 26. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 884 (noting the argument that the statute did not classify 
individuals on the basis of gender or sexual orientation). 
 27. Id. at 885 (citing In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 441 (Cal. 2008)). 
 28. Id. at 880. 
 29. See id. at 885–89 (discussing the widespread recognition of these criteria). 
 30. Id. at 889 (pointing to laws criminalizing homosexual conduct, the dismissal of gays and 
lesbians from the military, and schoolyard bullying, among other forms of oppression). 
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prejudice.”31  Third, the court found that even if one’s sexual orientation 
is not an absolutely immutable trait, it is “highly resistant to change,” and 
thus “is not the type of human trait that allows courts to relax their 
standard of review because the barrier is temporary or susceptible to self-
help.”32  Finally, the court determined that “gay and lesbian people are 
not so politically powerful as to overcome the unfair and severe 
prejudice that history suggests produces discrimination based on sexual 
orientation.”33 
The court then found that it need not yet choose between 
intermediate and strict scrutiny for sexual-orientation classifications 
because Iowa’s ban on same-sex marriage could not survive under the 
less stringent of those two standards.34  Tracking the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s well-established description of intermediate scrutiny under the 
federal Equal Protection Clause,35 the Varnum court stated that, to 
survive judicial review, Iowa’s ban on same-sex marriage “‘must be 
substantially related to an important governmental objective’”36 and the 
state must have “‘exceedingly persuasive’ reasons for denying civil 
marriage to same-sex couples.”37 
The court determined that the statute failed to meet those demanding 
standards.  Simply preserving the traditional concept of marriage was not 
a sufficiently persuasive governmental objective, the court said, because 
it would render the analysis entirely circular: it was the constitutional 
validity of the state’s effort to preserve the traditional concept of 
marriage that was itself in question.38  Promoting the best interests of 
children is certainly an important governmental goal, the court 
observed,39 but the ban on same-sex marriage was not substantially 
related to that objective.  Even if one believes that children are better off 
when raised by opposite-sex parents than when raised by same-sex 
parents,40 the court reasoned that the statute’s means of protecting 
                                                     
 31. Id. at 890–91. 
 32. Id. at 893. 
 33. Id. at 895. 
 34. Id. at 896 (“Because we conclude Iowa’s same-sex marriage statute cannot withstand 
intermediate scrutiny, we need not decide whether classifications based on sexual orientation are 
subject to a higher level of scrutiny.”). 
 35. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 36. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 896 (quoting Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988)). 
 37. Id. at 897 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996)). 
 38. See id. at 898–99. 
 39. See id. at 899. 
 40. The court observed that there is a substantial body of evidence suggesting that “the interests 
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children were under-inclusive insofar as the statute permitted “child 
abusers, sexual predators, parents neglecting to provide child support, 
and violent felons” to marry, even though they “are undeniably less than 
optimal parents.”41  The court further found that the statute’s means were 
over-inclusive insofar as many same-sex couples would never bear or 
raise children.42  Nor was the ban on same-sex marriage substantially 
related to the goal of promoting procreation—the court found no reason 
to believe that, finding themselves unable to marry persons of their own 
sex, gays and lesbians would opt to enter into heterosexual relationships 
and bear children.43  Similarly, the court found that promoting the 
stability of heterosexual relationships is an important governmental 
objective, but that there was no apparent reason to believe that 
proscribing same-sex marriages helped to achieve that goal.44 
In the court’s judgment, the lack of a good fit between important 
government objectives and the ban on same-sex marriage demonstrated 
that the statute “is less about using marriage to achieve [important 
governmental ends] and more about merely precluding gay and lesbian 
people from civil marriage.”45  Finding no “exceedingly persuasive” 
justification for refusing to recognize same-sex marriages, the justices 
declared the statute unconstitutional.46 
Iowa’s first same-sex marriage ceremonies were conducted within 
weeks of the ruling.47  Over the course of the following year, more than  
                                                                                                                       
of children are served equally well by same-sex parents and opposite-sex parents,” but conceded 
“the existence of reasoned opinions that dual-gender parenting is the optimal environment for 
children.”  Id.; see also Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 388 (D. Mass. 2010) 
(“[A] consensus has developed among the medical, psychological, and social welfare communities 
that children raised by gay and lesbian parents are just as likely to be well-adjusted as those raised by 
heterosexual parents.”); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2010) 
(“Children raised by gay or lesbian parents are as likely as children raised by heterosexual parents to 
be healthy, successful and well-adjusted.  The research supporting this conclusion is accepted 
beyond serious debate in the field of developmental psychology.”). 
 41. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 900–01. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 901–02. 
 44. Id. at 902.  The court also rejected the claim that the statute was justified by a desire to 
conserve the state’s financial resources.  Id. at 902–03. 
 45. Id. at 901. 
 46. Id. at 904 (“Our equal protection clause requires more than has been offered to justify the 
continued existence of the same-sex marriage ban under the statute.”); id. at 906 (“Iowa Code 
section 595.2 is unconstitutional because the [governmental defendant] has been unable to identify a 
constitutionally adequate justification for excluding plaintiffs from the institution of civil 
marriage.”). 
 47. Amy Lorentzen, In Iowa, Same-Sex Couples Rush to Tie the Knot, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 
2009, at A4 (reporting Iowa’s first same-sex marriages). 
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two thousand same-sex couples exchanged vows in Iowa, with roughly 
sixty percent of those couples coming to Iowa from other states.48 
III. THE RETENTION BATTLE 
It did not take long for social conservatives to denounce the court’s 
ruling;49 calls for a constitutional amendment to restore the ban on same-
sex marriage erupted immediately after the Varnum opinion came 
down.50  Yet the amendment process in Iowa is arduous.51  The state 
constitution gives voters an opportunity every ten years to decide 
whether to hold a constitutional convention.52  Yet voters have repeatedly 
declined that invitation,53 and they declined it again in November 2010 
by a two-to-one margin.54  The only other way to amend the constitution 
involves a lengthy series of votes: a proposal to amend the constitution 
must first win the approval of a majority in the state legislature; after an 
intervening general election, the proposal must again win the backing of 
a majority in the state legislature; and then the proposed amendment 
must be submitted to the citizenry for final approval.55  Democrats in the 
                                                     
 48. Tony Leys, Iowa’s 2,000 Gay Marriages Mostly from Nonresidents, DES MOINES REG., 
May 19, 2010, at B3. 
 49. Indeed, some conservatives were suspicious of other conservatives who said they wanted to 
take some time to reflect on the ruling before announcing their views about it.  See, e.g., Jason 
Hancock, Salier: Grassley Could Be Primaried, IOWA INDEP., Apr. 10, 2009, 
http://iowaindependent.com/13888/salier-grassley-could-be-primaried (noting that some 
conservatives condemned Iowa’s U.S. Senator Charles Grassley for failing to denounce the ruling 
immediately). 
 50. See Elizabeth Ahlin, Same-Sex Couples Rejoice, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Apr. 3, 2009, at 
A1 (reporting calls for a constitutional amendment by several Republicans in the state legislature and 
by leaders of the Iowa Family Policy Center); Andy Birkey, Iowa State Senator: Religious Right 
Won’t Win Iowa Marriage Debate, MINN. INDEP., Apr. 3, 2009, http://minnesotaindependent.com/ 
31096/iowa-state-senator-religious-right-wont-win-iowa-marriage-debate (“Religious right leaders 
immediately vowed to fight the decision with a constitutional amendment . . . .”). 
 51. Data available in 1991 revealed that Iowa then had the sixth-lowest annual rate of 
constitutional amendments in the nation.  See Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional 
Amendment, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENT 237, 248–49 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995). 
 52. IOWA CONST. art. X, § 3 (stating that every ten years, “the question, ‘Shall there be a 
convention to revise the constitution, and propose amendment or amendments to same?’ shall be 
decided by the electors qualified to vote for members of the general assembly”). 
 53. The convention question has appeared on Iowa voters’ ballots every ten years since 1870, 
and voters have answered it in the affirmative only once, in 1920.  Dan Piller, Iowans Vote Against 
Constitutional Convention, DES MOINES REG., Nov. 3, 2010, at A8.  Presented with that affirmative 
vote in 1920, the legislature failed to make the necessary arrangements and so the convention was 
never held.  Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. IOWA CONST. art. X, § 1. 
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state legislature thwarted early Republican efforts to start down that 
difficult path,56 prompting social conservatives to look for other ways to 
express their disapproval of Varnum.  The appearance of three of the 
Iowa Supreme Court’s seven justices on the November 2010 ballot 
provided the opportunity that those citizens were seeking. 
Using retention elections as an occasion to express disapproval of 
particular rulings was certainly not what those who first urged states to 
adopt merit-selection and retention systems originally had in mind.  
Albert Kales, co-founder of the American Judicature Society, proposed a 
merit-selection system for state judges in 1914, hoping to curb the 
perceived evils associated with judges who had to depend upon winning 
elections and remaining in good stead with politically powerful actors in 
order to win and keep their seats on the bench.57  Kales and likeminded 
reformers added retention elections to their proposals not because they 
regarded those elections as an essential piece of the puzzle, but rather 
because they believed that including some sort of opportunity for voter 
input would be essential in order to make their proposals politically 
saleable among influential Progressives.58  As Judge Duane Benton of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently 
observed, retention elections 
were designed to allow qualified judges to serve long terms with only a 
modest amount of direct accountability.  Indeed, those who developed 
the concept preferred life tenure, but they acquiesced to political 
realities and allowed the public an opportunity to remove judges in 
extreme circumstances.  Clearly removal was perceived as the 
exception, not the rule.59 
                                                     
 56. See Mary Rae Bragg, Same-Sex Marriage Issue Roils Republican Leaders, TELEGRAPH 
HERALD (Dubuque, Iowa), May 3, 2009, at A14 (reporting some conservatives’ frustration with 
Republicans’ inability to surmount procedural obstacles that Democrats raised against GOP efforts 
to propose an amendment banning same-sex marriage); Jason Hancock, Is Gay Marriage 
Complacency Creating Cracks in GOP Unity?, IOWA INDEP., Apr. 27, 2009, 
http://iowaindependent.com/14513/is-gay-marriage-complacency-creating-cracks-in-gop-unity 
(same). 
 57. See G. Alan Tarr, Do Retention Elections Work?, 74 MO. L. REV. 605, 608–09 (2009). 
 58. See id. at 607–09; Luke Bierman, Beyond Merit Selection, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 851, 
853–57 (2002); William K. Hall & Larry T. Aspin, What Twenty Years of Judicial Retention 
Elections Have Told Us, 70 JUDICATURE 340, 340–42 (1987).  For a brief overview of the many 
different types of merit systems currently in place in the various states, see Bierman, supra, at 857–
60. 
 59. Duane Benton, Comments on the White, Caufield, and Tarr Articles, 74 MO. L. REV. 667, 
669 (2009) (quoting Susan B. Carbon, Judicial Retention Elections: Are They Serving Their 
Intended Purpose?, 64 JUDICATURE 210, 233 (1980)). 
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Yet there is nothing to prevent a voter from casting a ballot against a 
judge’s retention for any reason he or she likes.  Indeed, many citizens 
reject the proposition that they ought to defer to judges in the face of 
rulings they find objectionable, finding that notion elitist and anti-
democratic.60  For better or worse, if voters are sufficiently angry about a 
particular ruling and are convinced that the justices reached the wrong 
conclusion—as were many in Iowa after the Iowa Supreme Court handed 
down its ruling in Varnum—judicial retention elections give them an 
opportunity to express their convictions. 
The notion of removing three state supreme court justices in one fell 
swoop was audacious, but not entirely unprecedented—it had happened 
elsewhere once before.  In November 1986, California voters removed 
Chief Justice Rose Bird, Justice Cruz Reynoso, and Justice Joseph 
Grodin from the California Supreme Court, primarily for their staunch 
opposition to the death penalty.61  If voter dissatisfaction had led to the 
ouster of three state supreme court justices once before in California, 
there was at least a slim chance that it could happen again in Iowa. 
The non-retention campaign against Chief Justice Ternus, Justice 
Streit, and Justice Baker crystallized in the late summer of 2010 under 
the leadership of Bob Vander Plaats, a Sioux City businessman who was 
just coming off a defeat in the Republican gubernatorial primary.62  
                                                     
 60. Cf. Seth Andersen, Examining the Decline in Support for Merit Selection in the States, 67 
ALB. L. REV. 793, 796 (2004) (stating that, while proponents of merit selection stress the importance 
of preserving “the integrity and independence of the judiciary . . . [o]pponents of merit selection 
have a much simpler and more populist retort to the advocates of merit selection, the essence of 
which is, ‘don’t let them take away your right to vote on judges’”); Tarr, supra note 57, at 609–10 
(stating that “some critics complain that judges are frustrating popular government by reading their 
own ideological predilections into the law and that merit selection is ‘a masquerade to put political 
power in the hands of the organized bar and other members of the elite’” (quoting Paul D. 
Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest State Courts, 61 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 106 (1998))). 
 61. See Robert Lindsey, Defeated Justice Fearful of Attacks on Judiciary, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 
1986, at A7 (stating that Chief Justice Bird had “voted to overturn all 61 of the death sentences that 
came to the court for automatic review” and that “most of the most widely broadcast anti-Bird 
commercials were emotional appeals by parents and other [friends and relatives] of murder victims 
whose killers had escaped execution”); Mike Sprague, Voters Must Decide on State Supreme Court, 
Court of Appeal Justices, PASADENA STAR-NEWS, Oct. 29, 2010, available at 
http://www.pasadenastarnews.com/elections/ci_16472089  (recounting this history and stating that 
these are the only three California Supreme Court justices ever to be removed by voters after that 
state moved to a merit-selection and retention system in 1934).  Chief Justice Bird was unpopular 
among many voters and political leaders for additional reasons.  See Robert S. Thompson, A 
Retrospective on the California Retention Election of 1986, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 2007, 2022–32 
(1988) (stating, for example, that Chief Justice Bird seemed “ill at ease in the company of anyone 
who was not a longtime intimate,” that she “was secretive and withdrawn,” and that in her rulings 
and administrative decisions she seemed plainly to favor the Democratic Party). 
 62. See Thomas Beaumont, Vander Plaats Supporters Weigh a Push at Convention for No. 2 
 
PETTYS FINAL 5/14/2011  12:44:21 PM 
2011] THE OUSTER OF THREE JUSTICES 725 
Vander Plaats’s chief opponent in that primary had been Terry Branstad, 
who ultimately would go on to defeat the Democratic incumbent, Chet 
Culver, in the general election later that fall.63  The battle between 
Vander Plaats and Branstad had been a battle between “religious, social 
and tea party conservatives,” who tended to favor Vander Plaats, and 
“business-oriented conservatives and centrists,” who tended to favor 
Branstad.64  As one reporter noted the day after Vander Plaats’s defeat, 
Branstad had largely avoided the marriage debate, while Vander Plaats 
had placed his opposition to Varnum at the center of his primary 
campaign: 
Branstad campaigned largely as a pragmatist, arguing he had the best 
shot of ousting Democratic Gov. Chet Culver.  He focused on 
economic matters and glossed over emotional social issues, such as 
abortion and gay marriage.  That prompted some conservatives, most 
notably leaders of the influential Iowa Family Policy Center, to threaten 
to sit out the general election if Branstad won the nomination.  Vander 
Plaats tried to appeal to social and religious conservatives by 
concentrating on gay marriage, an issue that soared to prominence last 
year after the Iowa Supreme Court ruled that a ban on same-sex unions 
violated the state constitution.65 
During his unsuccessful primary bid, Vander Plaats had urged 
Iowans to vote against retaining each of the three justices who would 
appear on the November 2010 ballot.66  Indeed, he even went so far as to 
pledge that, on his first day in office, he would issue an executive order 
thwarting Varnum by barring all same-sex marriages in the state.67  There 
                                                                                                                       
Role, DES MOINES REG., June 23, 2010, at A1 (reporting that Branstad had defeated Vander Plaats in 
the Republican gubernatorial primary by ten percentage points).  This was not Vander Plaats’s first 
attempt to secure the Republican nomination—he had tried, and failed, in 2002.  See Chris Clayton, 
Vander Plaats Says His Background Would Give Him an Edge in Iowa Governor’s Race, OMAHA 
WORLD-HERALD, May 28, 2002, at A1.  He made another unsuccessful bid for elective office—this 
time for the post of lieutenant governor—in 2006.  See Thomas Beaumont, Culver Coasts to Terrace 
Hill; Democrats Sweep Statehouse, Governorship, DES MOINES REG., Nov. 8, 2006, at A1 (reporting 
Vander Plaats’s loss in the general election). 
 63. See Thomas Beaumont, Iowans Give Terry Branstad an Encore, DES MOINES REG., Nov. 3, 
2010, at A1 (reporting Branstad’s victory over Culver). 
 64. Rod Boshart, GOP Picks Branstad to Face Culver for Iowa Governor’s Seat, QUAD-CITY 
TIMES (Davenport, Iowa), June 8, 2010, available at http://qctimes.com/news/local/government-and-
politics/elections/article_a349554e-7375-11df-9076-001cc4c002e0.html. 
 65. Mike Glover, Branstad Wins GOP Nomination, HAWK-EYE (Burlington, Iowa), June 9, 
2010, available at http://www.thehawkeye.com/print/Branstad-060910. 
 66. See id. 
 67. Elizabeth Ahlin, Vander Plaats Makes Third Bid to be Governor, THE TRIBUNE (Ames, 
Iowa), Dec. 17, 2010, available at http://www.amestrib.com/articles/2010/06/07/aimes_trib/news/ 
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is nothing in the Iowa Constitution that would authorize a governor to 
confront the judiciary in this way, but Vander Plaats had insisted that it 
would be “‘absolutely negligent of me as governor if I don’t hold the 
court in check when I know they went out of bounds.’”68  Iowa’s 
constitution would make him the state’s “chief magistrate,” he argued, 
and this would give him the “authority to check judicial review.”69 
After mulling over the possibility of an independent bid for the 
governorship, Vander Plaats announced on August 6, 2010, that he 
would devote his energies instead to leading the effort to oust the three 
Iowa Supreme Court justices who were up for retention.70  He created an 
organization called Iowa for Freedom to lead that campaign.71 
Vander Plaats’s actions alarmed many attorneys, academics, and 
former judges in the state.  They insisted that the non-retention initiative 
would threaten the Iowa judiciary’s independence by injecting a 
heightened measure of partisanship and politics into the selection and 
retention of Iowa’s judges, and that Vander Plaats’s campaign would 
diminish the number of qualified individuals who would be interested in 
taking seats on the state bench.72  The Institute for Legal Reform—an 
affiliate of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce—had recently released a 
study finding that Iowa’s judges ranked fourth in the nation for 
impartiality.73  This finding confirmed what many in Iowa’s legal 
community already believed—and they feared that Vander Plaats’s 
campaign would place Iowa’s reputable judicial system at risk.74  The 
Iowa State Bar Association released a poll of Iowa attorneys showing 
that the three targeted justices enjoyed strong support among members of 
                                                                                                                       
doc4c09d3dbdcedc887527658.txt; Glover, supra note 65 (stating that Vander Plaats had 
“repeatedly” made this pledge). 
 68. See Ahlin, supra note 67. 
 69. Matt Milner, Vander Plaats Visit Ottumwa One Week Before Primary: GOP Candidate 
Receives Backing of Can-Do Conservatives, OTTUMWA COURIER (Iowa), June 2, 2010, available at 
http://www.allbusiness.com/government/elections-politics-campaigns-elections/14564782-1.html. 
 70. See Rod Boshart, Vander Plaats Targets Justices, QUAD-CITY TIMES (Davenport, Iowa), 
Aug. 6, 2010, available at http://qctimes.com/news/state-and-regional/iowa/article_6b6df126-a1cd-
11df-86bb-001cc4c002e0.html; Jason Clayworth, Vander Plaats Seeks to Eject 3 Justices, DES 
MOINES REG., Aug. 7, 2010, at A1. 
 71. See Sandhya Somashekhar, Iowa Foes of Same-Sex Marriage Seek to Oust Judges Who 
Legalized It, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 2010, at A6. 
 72. See Boshart, supra note 70 (describing opposition to Vander Plaats’s campaign). 
 73. Institute for Legal Reform, Lawsuit Climate 2010, http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/ 
lawsuit-climate.html#/2010.  The study used numerous criteria to evaluate each state’s legal climate.  
By rolling one’s cursor over each state in the graphic that appears on the website, one can see how 
that state ranked on each of those criteria. 
 74. See Sulzberger, supra note 1 (explaining that the legal community “rallied behind the 
justices”). 
PETTYS FINAL 5/14/2011  12:44:21 PM 
2011] THE OUSTER OF THREE JUSTICES 727 
the Bar.75  Former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 
made a brief appearance in the state, praising Iowa’s merit-based system 
for selecting justices and urging voters not to deny retention to justices 
based on isolated rulings.76  Former Iowa Governor Robert Ray, a 
Republican, recalled the state of affairs prior to 1962 when aspiring 
judges had to run political campaigns to obtain and keep their seats on 
the bench, and he urged voters to retain the justices: 
“I have a lot of respect for this system that we have.  I practiced law 
when it was the other way and I’ll tell you that wasn’t much fun. . . . I 
think most people aren’t going to want to throw them out because they 
did what they thought was the right thing to do.”77 
Vander Plaats, however, did not have difficulty finding political 
allies.  A coalition of Iowa pastors urged their congregations to vote 
against the justices’ retention, for example, even while acknowledging 
that electoral advocacy could invite scrutiny of their organizations’ tax-
exempt status by the Internal Revenue Service.78  The pastors said that 
the Texas-based Liberty Institute had agreed to provide free legal 
representation if the IRS did indeed bring actions against them.79  A 
leader of the pastors’ coalition almost pleaded with the IRS to come after 
him, saying that he often recited a short prayer: “‘Dear God, . . . please 
                                                     
 75. Rod Boshart, Attorneys Give Iowa Judges High Ratings, SIOUX CITY JOURNAL Oct. 2, 
2010, available at http://www.siouxcityjournal.com/news/state-and-regional/iowa/article_f964ae67-
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participated in the survey, 83.7% approved of Justice Streit’s overall performance, 82.8% approved 
of Justice Baker’s overall performance, and 72% approved of Chief Justice Ternus’s overall 
performance). 
 76. Grant Schulte, O’Connor: Iowa Selection Process Is Fair, DES MOINES REG., Sept. 9, 2010, 
at B1. 
 77. Boshart, supra note 75.  En route to victory in the gubernatorial race, Republican Terry 
Branstad refused to take a public position on the retention issue.  See O. Kay Henderson, Branstad, 
Vander Plaats Differ on Approach to Judicial Retention Election, RADIO IOWA, Aug. 12, 2010, 
available at http://www.radioiowa.com/2010/08/12/branstad-vander-plaats-differ-on-approach-to-
judicial-retention-election. 
 78. Grant Schulte, Iowa Pastor: Churches Will Urge Voters to Remove 3 Justices, DES MOINES 
REG., Oct. 11, 2010, at A1 (describing a coalition of “more than 100 churches,” led by Cary Gordon, 
an associate pastor at Sioux City-based Cornerstone World Outreach).  See generally 26 U.S.C.  
§ 501(a) (2006) (declaring that certain kinds of organizations shall be exempt from taxation); id.  
§ 501(c)(3) (providing that a religious organization is exempt from taxation so long as, inter alia, it 
“does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any 
political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office”); Donald B. 
Tobin, Political Campaigning by Churches and Charities: Hazardous for 501(c)(3)s, Dangerous for 
Democracy, 95 GEO. L.J. 1313, passim (2007) (describing and evaluating the recent rise in churches’ 
political activities). 
 79. Schulte, supra note 78. 
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allow the IRS to attack my church, so I can take them all the way to the 
U.S. Supreme Court.’”80 
The non-retention campaign also won the backing of numerous out-
of-state organizations, including the Alliance Defense Fund, based in 
Arizona; the American Family Association, based in Mississippi; the 
Campaign for Working Families, based in Washington, D.C.; Citizens 
United, based in Washington, D.C.; the Faith & Freedom Coalition, 
based in Georgia; the Family Research Council, based in Washington, 
D.C.; and the National Organization for Marriage, based in New Jersey.81  
Tony Perkins, president of the Family Research Council, for example, 
participated in a bus tour of the state led by U.S. Representative Steve 
King, urging Iowans to denounce the justices’ ruling in Varnum.82  Two 
out-of-state organizations—the American Family Association and the 
National Organization for Marriage—played particularly influential 
roles, together pouring nearly $700,000 into the campaign to unseat the 
justices.83  This sum is all the more remarkable when one considers that, 
counting both in-state and out-of-state money, a total of approximately 
$800,000 was reportedly spent on the effort to reject the justices’ bids for 
retention,84 roughly double the amount spent on the effort to retain the 
justices.85 
Those non-retention dollars were used to wage a highly visible 
campaign.  For example, in one television advertisement sponsored by  
                                                     
 80. Id. 
 81. Andy Kopsa, National Anti-Gay Groups Unite to Target Iowa Judges, IOWA INDEP., Oct. 
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IOWA INDEP., Oct. 29, 2010, http://iowaindependent.com/46519/anti-retention-leaders-iowa-just-the-
start-of-gay-marriage-battle (reporting Perkins’ involvement); Schulte, supra note 7 (reporting 
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 83. See Press Release, Brennan Center for Justice, 2010 Judicial Elections Increase Pressure on 
Courts, Reform Groups Say (Nov. 3, 2010), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/content/ 
resource/2010_judicial_elections_increase_pressure_on_courts_reform_groups_say. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See id. (reporting that the group Fair Courts for Us spent approximately $400,000 on its 
pro-retention campaign and that a combined total of approximately $1.2 million was spent by anti- 
and pro-retention forces). 
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Iowa for Freedom, the National Organization for Marriage, and the 
Campaign for Working Families, the narrator told voters: 
Some in the ruling class say it is wrong for voters to hold Supreme 
Court judges accountable for their decisions . . . . When activist judges 
on Iowa’s Supreme Court imposed gay marriage, they were the only 
judges within 1200 miles to reach such a radical conclusion.  If they 
can redefine marriage [said the narrator, over images of parents, Boy 
Scouts, hunters, and flag-saluting schoolchildren], none of the freedoms 
we hold dear are safe from judicial activism.  To hold activist judges 
accountable, flip your ballot over and vote no on retention of Supreme 
Court justices.86 
An online video addressed to the state’s religious leaders recited the 
justices’ annual salaries and benefits; accused the justices of disregarding 
the will of the people and “160-years of Iowa law” when they overturned 
the ban on same-sex marriage; suggested that the justices might next 
disregard Iowans’ rights in the areas of property, parenting, voting, and 
“teach[ing] the truths of God;” and urged pastors and congregants to 
“pray effectively and vote righteously.”87  Another online video played 
off of viewers’ familiarity with eHarmony.com, the popular dating 
website: with the logo “e.Larmony.wrong” appearing at the bottom of the 
screen, a man and a woman discussed the history of their relationship 
and marriage, only to reveal at the end that they were brother and sister 
and that they were grateful to the Iowa Supreme Court for making their 
marriage possible.88 
The justices’ defenders formed a variety of groups to fight back.  In 
mid-August, one week after Vander Plaats formally announced his “Iowa 
for Freedom” campaign, a bipartisan group of individuals joined with the 
Iowa State Bar Association in launching an organization called Iowans 
for Fair and Impartial Courts (IFIC).89  IFIC’s core message was that 
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“Iowa’s merit selection and retention process are [sic] key to maintaining 
[Iowa’s] fair and impartial courts.”90  In late September, two former 
lieutenant governors (one Democrat and one Republican) created Justice 
Not Politics—a coalition of organizations that joined together in arguing 
that “Iowa’s merit selection and retention process keeps politics and 
campaign money out of our courts, safeguarding its fairness and 
impartiality.”91  But the creators of both IFIC and Justice Not Politics 
established themselves as tax-exempt 501(c)(3) organizations that could 
not overtly take a position on whether Iowans should vote for or against 
the justices’ retention.92  Many of Justice Not Politics’ coalition members 
were themselves 501(c)(3) organizations,93 and could not have 
participated in the coalition if the group had expressly urged voters to 
retain the justices.  As for IFIC, the Bar’s leaders had concluded that they 
were not authorized to engage in political advocacy on behalf of the 
Bar’s members until the Bar had completed its 2010 plebiscite, in which 
attorneys were asked to rate the performances of all of the justices and 
judges who were up for retention.94  Because voting in the plebiscite was 
not scheduled to conclude until late September95—more than a month 
after IFIC was formed—IFIC’s founders opted for 501(c)(3) status.96  As 
a result, neither Justice Not Politics nor IFIC explicitly campaigned on 
the justices’ behalf; instead, both organizations focused their energies on  
                                                                                                                       
MOINES REG., Aug. 13, 2010, at B1 (announcing IFIC’s creation). 
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 91. Coalition Opposes Politicizing Judiciary, DES MOINES REG., Sept. 28, 2010, at B2 
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http://www.justicenotpolitics.org/about (last visited Mar. 21, 2011). 
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(Sept. 17, 2010), http://www.globegazette.com/news/local/article_0a059afc-c2a1-11df-beff-
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Vote on “Back of the Ballot” Issues, DES MOINES REG., Oct. 29, 2010, at A1 (reporting Justice Not 
Politics’ tax-exempt status).  See generally 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006) (limiting the political 
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 93. See JUSTICENOTPOLITICS.ORG, supra note 91 (listing the coalition’s members, including 
churches and numerous other tax-exempt organizations). 
 94. Telephone Interview with Scott Brennan, Co-Founder, Iowans for Fair and Impartial Courts 
(Dec. 3, 2010). 
 95. 2010 Plebiscite Results, IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, http://www.iabar.net/display 
common.cfm?an=1&subarticlenbr=375 (last visited Mar. 21, 2011) (stating that the voting period 
ran from Sept. 3 to Sept. 24). 
 96. Telephone Interview with Scott Brennan, supra note 94. 
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educating voters about the virtues of minimizing the role of politics in 
the selection and retention of the state’s judges and justices.97 
Just three weeks before the election, a bipartisan pro-retention group 
called Fair Courts for Us—led in part by former Republican Governor 
Ray and by Dan Moore, a Republican who previously had served as the 
secretary and treasurer of Vander Plaats’s gubernatorial campaign—
arrived on the scene.98  Fair Courts for Us had quickly raised nearly 
$400,000 from, among others, the Iowa Trial Lawyers Association and 
the Iowa State Bar Association.99  (By early October, the Bar’s members 
had favorably rated each of the three targeted justices in the 2010 
plebiscite,100 and so the Bar’s leaders believed they finally were 
authorized to take a position on the justices’ retention.101)  Fair Courts for 
Us explicitly urged Iowans to keep the state’s judiciary “independent,” 
“fair,” and “non-partisan” by voting to retain the justices.102 
Two overarching observations can be made about the nature of the 
pro-retention campaign.  First, none of the pro-retention efforts yielded 
the same visceral punch as the efforts of the non-retention forces.  
Perhaps nowhere was that more evident than in one well-intentioned but 
patently feeble series of privately sponsored online videos, in which a 
woman repeatedly licked salt off her wrist and drank large glasses of 
water, pledging to “retain water until we retain our justices.”103  IFIC, 
Justice Not Politics, and Fair Courts for Us certainly advanced more 
substantive and high-minded messages, but they did so in ways that were 
less than rhetorically compelling. 
Second, in all of the organized pro-retention efforts, one message 
was conspicuously absent: proponents of retention focused persistently 
on their claim that Iowa’s system for choosing and retaining judges 
                                                     
 97. See JUSTICENOTPOLITICS.ORG, supra note 91 (stating the goals of Justice Not Politics and 
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should not be heavily politicized, but they said hardly a word in defense 
of the Varnum ruling itself.  On the issue of same-sex marriage—the 
issue at the center of the firestorm—the justices’ defenders almost 
entirely ceded the stage to Varnum’s critics.  In fact, when the justices’ 
defenders did speak on the issue of Varnum, their comments were 
sometimes far from positive.  In a radio advertisement sponsored by Fair 
Courts for Us, for example, former Governor Ray likened the targeted 
justices to good referees who had erred by making just one bad call.104  
The advertisement began with the voice of a football commentator 
saying: “And the flags are flying.  Looks like a questionable call.  I think 
we’re going to see some fans calling for these refs’ jobs.”105  Ray’s voice 
then appeared, saying, “Listen, we’ll never agree with every call, but you 
shouldn’t fire the good referees over just one call.  The same is true for 
the Iowa Supreme Court.”106 
The three justices themselves were reluctant to speak out on their 
own behalf and refused to raise money to run a retention campaign.107  
The week prior to the election, for example, the three justices were 
scheduled to appear at an Iowa City event organized by students at the 
University of Iowa College of Law—but the justices backed out when 
they learned that the event initially had been billed as a “Vote Yes on 
Retention” event, rather than an event aimed more generally at educating 
voters about the work of the courts.108  Chief Justice Ternus began to 
speak out somewhat more aggressively in the days immediately prior to 
the election, telling voters in Fairfield, for example, that voting the 
justices out of office would lead to more heavily politicized retention  
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battles and that judges make poorer decisions when they have to worry 
about the personal political consequences of their rulings.109 
When Election Day finally arrived, one player in the Varnum story 
received good news: Polk County District Judge Robert Hanson—the 
district judge who had struck down the ban on same-sex marriage at the 
trial level but who never was aggressively targeted in the non-retention 
campaign—was among the more than seventy state judges whom the 
voters opted to retain.110  The news for the three supreme court justices 
was more grim.  Approximately 450,000 Iowans cast ballots favoring 
their retention, but more than 530,000 voted against them.111  Polling 
conducted by the Des Moines Register just prior to the election indicated 
that the vote was heavily partisan, with roughly two-thirds of likely 
Republican voters—but only approximately one-fifth of likely 
Democratic voters—saying that they intended to vote against the 
justices.112  In Iowa City—where the University of Iowa sits and where 
proponents of same-sex marriage are more easily found than in some 
other portions of the state—university students flocked to election 
stations in order to voice their opposition to a city ordinance that 
prevents individuals under twenty-one years of age from entering bars, 
but nearly sixty percent of them failed to cast any vote at all on the 
justices’ retention.113 
The day after the election, Chief Justice Ternus, Justice Streit, and 
Justice Baker issued a short joint statement: 
It has been our great pleasure to serve the people of Iowa as justices on 
the Iowa Supreme Court.  Throughout our judicial service, we have 
endeavored to fulfill our duty to Iowans by always adhering to the rule 
of law, making decisions fairly and impartially according to law, and 
faithfully upholding the constitution. 
We thank all of the Iowans who voted to retain judges around the state 
for another term.  Your support shows that many of our citizens value 
fair and impartial courts.  We also want to acknowledge and thank all 
the Iowans, from across the political spectrum and from different walks 
of life, who worked tirelessly over the past few months to defend 
                                                     
 109. See Milner, supra note 107. 
 110. See OFFICIAL RESULTS REPORT, supra note 13, at 77 (reporting vote totals indicating that 
Judge Hanson won retention by a 66–34 margin); Birbaum, supra note 17 (reporting that seventy-
four Iowa judges had been up for retention on the November 2010 ballot). 
 111. See OFFICIAL RESULTS REPORT, supra note 13, at 5, 10, 15. 
 112. See Clayworth, supra note 12. 
 113. See Sam Lane, Student Voters Stuck to 21-Only, DAILY IOWAN, Nov. 11, 2010, at A1. 
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Iowa’s high-caliber court system against an unprecedented attack 
funded by out-of-state special interest groups. 
Finally, we hope Iowans will continue to support Iowa’s merit selection 
system for appointing judges.  This system helps ensure that judges 
base their decisions on the law and the Constitution and nothing else.  
Ultimately, however, the preservation of our state’s fair and impartial 
courts will require more than the integrity and fortitude of individual 
judges, it will require the steadfast support of the people.114 
At the time of this writing, the fifteen members of Iowa’s judicial 
nominating commission are working to assemble the slate of names from 
which the governor will choose in order to fill the supreme court’s three 
vacancies.115  Under Iowa law, the most senior member of the Iowa 
Supreme Court who is not the court’s chief justice serves as the chair of 
the nominating commission.116  That post previously had been held by 
Justice Mark Cady, Varnum’s author.117  But Justice Cady was chosen by 
his colleagues to serve as the court’s new chief justice, replacing Chief 
Justice Ternus, so the new chair of the nominating commission will be 
Justice David Wiggins.118  Governor-elect Branstad, meanwhile, is 
arguing that the nominating commission—on which twelve Democrats,  
                                                     
 114. Statement of Three Supreme Court Justices on Retention Election Results, IOWA JUDICIAL 
BRANCH (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.iowacourts.gov/news_service/news_releases/NewsItem438/ 
index.asp. 
 115. See IOWA CONST. art. V, § 15 (“Vacancies in the supreme court . . . shall be filled by 
appointment by the governor from lists of nominees submitted by the appropriate judicial 
nominating commission.  Three nominees shall be submitted for each supreme court vacancy . . . .”); 
id. § 16 (describing the composition of the committee); IOWA CODE §§ 46.12–.15 (2009) (describing 
the commission’s duties when confronted with a vacancy on the supreme court).  At the time of this 
writing, there also is a debate brewing about how lame-duck Governor Culver should proceed if the 
commission presents him with a slate of names before he leaves office in mid-January: Should he fill 
one or more of the vacancies himself or should he defer to newly elected Governor Branstad?  See 
Editorial, It’s Branstad’s Call, GAZETTE (Cedar Rapids, Iowa), Nov. 12, 2010, available at 
http://thegazette.com/2010/11/12/it’s-branstad’s-call/ (urging Culver to let Branstad fill the 
vacancies); Mehaffey, supra note 81 (quoting Branstad as saying that “‘it would be inappropriate to 
have a governor that was just rejected by the voters try to rush through appointments to the court’”). 
 116. See IOWA CONST. art. V, § 16 (“The judge of the supreme court who is senior in length of 
service on said court, other than the chief justice, shall also be a member of such commission and 
shall be its chairman.”). 
 117. See Mehaffey, supra note 81 (noting that Justice Cady was then the commission’s chair). 
 118. See Grant Schulte, Iowa Supreme Court Picks Cady as Chief Justice, DES MOINES REG., 
Dec. 3, 2010, at B1.  The justices have said that they intend to hold another vote to fill the chief 
justice’s seat once the court’s three new members have been named, so that those new members can 
participate in the choice.  See id.; see generally IOWA CODE § 602.4103 (“The justices of the 
supreme court shall select one justice as chief justice, to serve during that justice’s term of office.”). 
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one Republican, and one non-affiliated individual currently sit with 
Justice Cady—needs more balanced political representation.119 
Vander Plaats is urging Iowa’s elected officials to find a way to 
quickly end same-sex marriage in the state.  Reviving the idea he floated 
during his unsuccessful bid for the Republican gubernatorial 
nomination,120 Vander Plaats is asking Branstad, the incoming 
Republican governor, to issue an executive order banning the 
enforcement of Varnum.121  Branstad regarded the proposal as 
unconstitutional during his primary bid and has said that he still remains 
opposed to the idea.122  Vander Plaats is also urging the state 
legislature—where Republicans control the house and where Democrats 
narrowly control the senate—to enact a new statute banning both same-
sex marriage and judicial review of the statute’s validity, thereby forcing 
a new confrontation with the Iowa Supreme Court.123 
As for the prospect of adopting a constitutional amendment barring 
same-sex marriage, the earliest the issue could be placed before Iowa 
voters is 2014.124  Whether that occurs depends almost entirely, for now, 
upon whether Democrats are able and willing to block the amendment 
process with their slim majority in the state senate.125  Michael Gronstal, 
the senate’s Democratic majority leader, successfully blocked debate on 
the amendment proposal in 2009, and he has vowed to block debate on 
the measure again when the legislature reconvenes in 2011.126  
Branstad—who signed the ban on same-sex marriage into law during an 
earlier stint as governor and who resumes the governorship in January  
                                                     
 119. See Grant Schulte, Removal of Justices Complicates Court’s Calendar, DES MOINES REG., 
Nov. 4, 2010, at A1. 
 120. See supra note 67–69 and accompanying text. 
 121. See Rod Boshart, What’s Next for Same-Sex Marriage Opponents?, QUAD-CITY TIMES 
(Davenport, Iowa), Nov. 4, 2010, at A5. 
 122. See id. 
 123. See id. 
 124. See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text (describing the multi-stage amendment 
process). 
 125. See Boshart, supra note 121 (noting that Republicans in the house are likely to propose an 
amendment banning same-sex marriage, but that the “issue may stall in the Senate”); Todd Dorman, 
History Is Made, but Not Finished, GAZETTE (Cedar Rapids, Iowa), Nov. 3, 2010, available at 
http://thegazette.com/2010/11/03/history-is-made-but-not-finished (“The Democratic majority in the 
Senate, if it holds, is likely too narrow to halt a vote on a constitutional amendment banning 
marriage equity.”). 
 126. See Mike Glover, Gronstal Vows to Block Vote on Gay Marriage, TELEGRAPH HERALD, 
Nov. 13, 2010, at D7. 
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2011—has vowed to push the legislature to propose the amendment and 
give Iowa’s citizens an opportunity to vote on the issue.127 
Finally, the justices’ actions in Varnum have already begun to 
influence the 2012 presidential campaign.  Vander Plaats has created a 
new political-advocacy organization called The Family Leader, and has 
said that it will closely scrutinize Republican candidates in Iowa’s 2012 
presidential caucuses and then make an endorsement.128  Former 
Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee, who employed Vander Plaats as his 
Iowa campaign chairman during his 2008 bid for the Republican 
presidential nomination, spoke at The Family Leader’s inaugural 
meeting, where he praised Iowans’ removal of the three justices and 
made it clear that he is contemplating a run for the White House in 
2012.129  Former House Speaker Newt Gingrich, who has confirmed that 
he too is considering a bid for the 2012 Republican presidential 
nomination,130 is similarly seeking political leverage from Varnum.  Prior 
to the November 2010 election, Gingrich urged Iowans to vote against 
the justices’ retention in order to send the nation a signal that a “citizen 
revolt” is underway against “dictatorial” judges.131  At a book signing in 
West Des Moines two weeks after the November election, Gingrich 
declared that the four remaining justices on the Iowa Supreme Court 
ought to resign because voters had made it plain that those justices, too, 
would have lost their jobs if their names had appeared on the ballot.132  
“‘[T]he governed have indicated they don’t agree with this court,’” he 
said, “‘so I think if they have any sense of integrity about protecting the 
court, they’ll step down.’”133 
IV. CONCLUSION: LESSONS FROM THE IOWA EXPERIENCE 
It is too soon to tell whether the ouster of Chief Justice Ternus, 
Justice Streit, and Justice Baker will lead to a new era of heavily 
politicized retention votes in Iowa and to a new era of politically driven 
                                                     
 127. See Robynn Tysver, Branstad Says He’s All About Future, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Oct. 
17, 2010, available at http://www.omaha.com/article/20101017/NEWS01/710179877. 
 128. See Thomas Beaumont, Vander Plaats to Lead Coalition of Conservatives, DES MOINES 
REG., Nov. 16, 2010, at B1. 
 129. See Political Notebook, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 22, 2010, at A4. 
 130. See Thomas Beaumont, Newt Gingrich: I’m Working to Clear Path for 2012 Presidential 
Run, DES MOINES REG., Nov. 17, 2010, at B1. 
 131. See Jason Hancock, 2012 Hopefuls Support Campaign to Oust Justices, IOWA INDEP. (Aug. 
13, 2010), http://iowaindependent.com/41151/2012-hopefuls-support-campaign-to-oust-judges. 
 132. See Beaumont, supra note 130. 
 133. Id. 
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behavior on the part of some of Iowa’s judges and justices, as the 
justices’ defenders warned that it would.134  There certainly is a great 
deal of anxiety within the Iowa legal community that the state is now 
headed in precisely that direction.135  For two principal reasons, my own 
expectations are more optimistic.  First, it seems to me that the stars fell 
into a rare and powerful alignment in 2010, with a substantial influx of 
out-of-state money being used to run a relentless campaign against 
justices who had issued a high-profile ruling on one of the most 
controversial social issues of our time during a period marked by strong 
anti-incumbent and anti-government sentiment—and although the 
justices’ defenders seemed caught almost entirely flat-footed by the non-
retention campaign, forty-five to forty-six percent of the Iowa electorate 
still favored the justices’ retention.136  There is good reason to believe, 
therefore, that worries about the future of Iowa’s courts are overblown.  
In the wake of California’s 1986 retention election, for example, Chief 
Justice Bird predicted that her ouster would embolden ideologically 
driven forces to use retention elections to wield great control over the 
state’s judiciary,137 but those fears have not notably materialized.138  Two 
years after the removal of Chief Justice Bird and two of her colleagues 
from the bench, a former California judge concluded that “the results of 
the 1986 election are not causes for serious concern.  An extraordinary 
set of circumstances combined to cause them, so extraordinary that it is 
unlikely that a similar set will soon, or ever, arise again.”139  One hopes 
that a comparable story will be told about the Iowa election of 2010. 
Second, although Vander Plaats and his allies believe they have sent 
a powerful message to Iowa’s judges and justices, the three ousted 
justices have sent a powerful message of their own.  Chief Justice 
Ternus, Justice Streit, and Justice Baker undoubtedly knew that the 
court’s ruling in Varnum would be controversial and they knew that they 
would be up for retention in 2010, yet they nevertheless ruled in the way 
that they believed was most faithful to the state’s constitutional 
principles.  Vander Plaats believes that those three justices have now 
                                                     
 134. See supra notes 72–75, 89–97 and accompanying text. 
 135. See supra notes 72–75, 89–97 and accompanying text. 
 136. See supra note 13 (describing the justices’ margins of defeat).  For his part, Vander Plaats 
has said that he is unlikely to lead non-retention campaigns against the remaining justices.  See 
Schulte, supra note 7. 
 137. See Lindsey, supra note 61. 
 138. See Dann & Hansen, supra note 7, at 1432–33 (noting that “many analysts feared that 
California’s judicial retention process was forever tainted,” but finding that subsequent threats of 
non-retention never plainly materialized). 
 139. See Thompson, supra note 61, at 2063. 
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been held up as cautionary examples of badly behaving judges,140 but 
those who continue to don the black robes in Iowa might reach precisely 
the opposite conclusion.  Former Iowa Supreme Court Justice Mark 
McCormick has said, for example, that the only lesson he learned from 
the successful non-retention campaign in California when he was on the 
bench was “‘that judges have got to have courage.’”141  I count myself 
among those who believe that the overwhelming majority of Iowa’s 
judges and justices will draw from the 2010 experience no greater lesson 
than that.  With respect to the Iowa Supreme Court in particular, each of 
the three new justices will be chosen from the short list of names 
supplied by the state’s judicial nominating commission, and I am 
confident that the commission will narrow the pool to the same kinds of 
qualified candidates from among whom Chief Justice Ternus, Justice 
Streit, and Justice Baker themselves were chosen.142 
                                                     
 140. Vander Plaats’s claim that the threat of non-retention can influence judges’ and justices’ 
behavior is not without support.  Not long after losing his own battle to remain on the California 
Supreme Court in 1986, for example, Justice Joseph Grodin wrote: 
The message which [elections like the California judicial election of 1986] sends to 
judges is that if they want to avoid negative votes, it is best to produce results with which 
the voters will agree.  The risk that judges will receive and act upon that message, 
unconsciously if not consciously, is substantial. 
Joseph R. Grodin, Developing a Consensus of Constraint: A Judge’s Perspective on Judicial 
Retention Elections, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1969, 1980 (1988); see also Joanna M. Shepherd, The 
Influence of Retention Politics on Judges’ Voting, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 169, 197 (2009) (concluding 
that supreme court justices who face retention votes in Republican-leaning states “tend to decide 
cases in accord with standard Republican policy,” and that the opposite is true for judges facing 
retention votes in Democratic-leaning states). 
 141. Schulte, supra note 7. 
 142. Writing about retention elections in general, Alan Tarr has made a comparable observation: 
If a qualified judge is removed from office in a retention election and the merit-selection 
process is working well, then his or her replacement would likewise be a qualified judge.  
The effect would be great on the particular judge but not, presumably, on the quality of 
justice within the court system.  Although voters can remove a judge with whose 
interpretations they disagree, they cannot guarantee that the judge’s replacement will 
share their understanding of the law. 
Tarr, supra note 57, at 631.  But negative retention votes surely do have consequences.  After his 
1986 ouster from the California Supreme Court, for example, Justice Grodin had the following 
reflection: 
[W]hatever the effect of a pending election campaign might be upon judicial decisions, 
the public perception of effect is inevitable and unavoidable.  For example, during the 
1986 campaign the court filed an opinion affirming the imposition of the death penalty 
which I wrote and Justice Reynoso, who was also on the ballot, signed.  The opposition 
group immediately called a press conference to charge that the two of us acted as we did 
only for political reasons.  I know of no effective way to refute that kind of allegation. 
Grodin, supra note 140, at 1980 (citation omitted).  No matter how they rule in particular cases, the 
members of the Iowa Supreme Court undoubtedly will now have to tolerate comparable speculations 
about their motivations. 
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Settings aside the particulars of what might happen next in Iowa, 
there are a number of important lessons that academics, activists, and 
judges nationwide might learn from the Iowa experience.  I offer several 
such lessons here, confident that others will add to the list. 
A. Money Matters 
The nation certainly did not need another lesson on the influential 
role of money in American politics.  Iowa’s recent retention election 
nevertheless reminds us yet again that, when one side in a political 
contest holds as much as a two-to-one financial advantage over the 
other,143 outcomes are not terribly difficult to predict.144 
B. Constitutionalism and Judicial Review Need Better Political 
Marketing 
The non-retention forces insisted that the justices in Varnum 
illegitimately trumped the sovereign people’s will with their own.145  
Celebrating the justices’ ouster on election night, Vander Plaats declared 
that the election would send a nationwide message that “power resides 
with the people,” not with the courts.146  The justices were depicted as 
over-paid, out-of-touch members of the “ruling class” who did not 
understand their proper role in our democratic system of government.147  
Yet the Iowa Constitution is the premier expression of the sovereign 
people’s will in Iowa—like their counterparts in other jurisdictions, 
Iowans have declared that any statute that violates the constitution is 
invalid.148  By seeking to vindicate the apparent demands of the Iowa 
Constitution’s equality clause,149 the justices in Varnum thus believed 
that it was precisely the constitutionally enshrined will of the people that 
they were honoring.150  By focusing almost entirely on concerns about 
                                                     
 143. See supra notes 83–85 and accompanying text (describing the disparity in funding). 
 144. In the California election of 1986, opponents of the three California Supreme Court justices 
held a comparable three-to-two fundraising advantage.  Thompson, supra note 61, at 2038 (stating 
that the justices’ opponents spent approximately $6.6 million, while the justices’ defenders spent 
approximately $4.1 million). 
 145. See supra notes 14–15, 86–87 and accompanying text. 
 146. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 147. See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text. 
 148. IOWA CONST. art. XII, § 1 (“This constitution shall be the supreme law of the state, and any 
law inconsistent therewith, shall be void.”). 
 149. See supra Part II. 
 150. Cf. Des Moines Joint Stock Land Bank v. Nordholm, 253 N.W. 701, 722–23 (Iowa 1934) 
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judicial fairness and impartiality, and by failing to respond aggressively 
to the claim that the justices had ignored the will of the people, the 
justices’ defenders thus failed to effectively join issue on one of the 
primary themes of the opposition.  Crafting thirty-second television 
advertisements aimed at defending notions of constitutionalism and 
judicial review undoubtedly is not easy, but if one’s arguments are to 
gain a powerful foothold in the hearts and minds of ordinary citizens, one 
must do better than rely upon bloodless abstractions about fairness and 
the rule of law.151 
In that regard, one cannot help but draw comparisons to the 1986 
retention election in California.152  In the face of highly emotional ads 
that charged three California justices with favoring killers over victims 
and their families, the justices themselves opted not to mount a vigorous 
defense of their rulings, choosing instead to “stress[] the traditional 
independence of the judiciary”—the one message that pollsters had 
determined “would not work.”153  As one former California judge 
observed, the justices and their defenders ran a campaign that “was 
frequently bland” and that failed to match the raw rhetorical power of the 
campaign run by their opponents.154  With admiration for the motives of 
those who led the pro-retention campaign in Iowa, one finds that the 
same must be said of their efforts. 
C. The Justices’ Defenders Made a Mistake When They Opted Not to 
Defend Varnum on Its Merits 
The California comparison suggests another way in which the pro-
retention campaign in Iowa was ill-conceived.  Hostility to same-sex 
marriage permeated the campaign against the justices, but leaders of the 
pro-retention campaign remained almost entirely silent on the subject.155  
That now seems clearly to have been a mistake.  Without a vigorous 
                                                                                                                       
(Claussen, C.J., dissenting) (pointing out that Iowa’s judges are obliged to honor the constitutionally 
enshrined will of the people of Iowa and that the people themselves have said that judges must 
invalidate statutes that violate the Iowa Constitution). 
 151. See supra notes 89–102 and accompanying text (describing the core themes of the pro-
retention campaign). 
 152. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (briefly describing the 1986 California retention 
election). 
 153. John T. Wold & John H. Culver, The Defeat of the California Justices: The Campaign, the 
Electorate, and the Issue of Judicial Accountability, 70 JUDICATURE 348, 350 (1987). 
 154. Thompson, supra note 61, at 2039. 
 155. See supra notes 86–109 and accompanying text (describing the core themes of the anti-
retention and pro-retention campaigns and the virtual silence of the pro-retention campaign’s leaders 
regarding Varnum). 
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defense of Varnum’s reasoning, some of the central claims of the 
justices’ critics were left largely unanswered.  The silence of the justices’ 
defenders implicitly conveyed the message that Iowans should opt for the 
lesser of two evils: the supreme court might occasionally reach 
conclusions that we would prefer not to defend, the justices’ defenders 
seemed to say, but that arrangement is preferable to one in which money 
and politics play prominent roles in the work of the courts.  Indeed, the 
justices’ defenders sometimes conveyed that message explicitly, as in the 
radio advertisement sponsored by Fair Courts for Us, in which the 
targeted justices were likened to good referees who had forgivably erred 
by making one bad call.156  Voters who had a viscerally negative reaction 
to images of homosexuality or same-sex marriage thus were given little 
reason to reflect critically upon their own moral and religious 
convictions—instead, they were asked to subordinate those beliefs to 
beliefs about the need to preserve the integrity of Iowa’s courts.  Viewed 
from those voters’ vantage point, rhetoric about fairness, impartiality, 
and judicial independence—stripped from any substantive defense of 
Varnum itself—was all but certain to fall flat. 
D. Defenders of Same-Sex Marriage Must Speak to Their Opponents’ 
Perceptions of Freedom 
The justices’ critics repeatedly claimed that Varnum signals a threat 
to a whole range of freedoms, in areas ranging from parenting, to 
property rights, to hunting, and to voting.157  Indeed, the organization that 
Vander Plaats created to lead the non-retention effort was called “Iowa 
for Freedom,”158 suggesting that freedom was the very thing that the 
justices in Varnum placed at risk.  There are at least two different ways 
to construe the substantive beliefs that lay beneath that claim.  The first 
possibility is simply that critics of Varnum feared that justices who 
disregarded the statutorily expressed will of the people on the issue of 
same-sex marriage might disregard the statutorily expressed will of the 
people in other areas, as well.  There is little doubt that many hold that 
belief.  But the link that social conservatives drew between Varnum and 
freedom also likely tells us something important about social 
conservatives’ perceptions regarding the marriage issue itself.  While 
defenders of same-sex marriage see Varnum as a ruling that plainly 
                                                     
 156. See supra notes 104–06 and accompanying text. 
 157. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text. 
 158. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
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expanded citizens’ freedoms by expanding the range of people who 
could take part in a valued civil institution, many of Varnum’s critics see 
that ruling as constricting citizens’ freedoms.  They see same-sex 
marriage as an encroachment upon their territory—an encroachment that 
narrows their ability to attach their own preferred connotations to the 
institution of marriage.  In a political battle of the sort waged in Iowa’s 
2010 retention election, that perception demands explicit 
acknowledgement, unpacking, and critiquing. 
E. The Success of the Non-retention Campaign Lends Ironic Support to 
Varnum’s Premises 
The justices in Varnum reasoned that some form of heightened 
scrutiny is appropriate for sexual-orientation classifications because, 
among other things, gays and lesbians have often been the target of 
prejudice and lack the political power to respond to that prejudice 
effectively.159  The success of the non-retention campaign provides at 
least a modicum of evidence that the court’s observations were well 
founded.  If the reasoning in Varnum needed added reinforcement in 
order to help persuade skeptical readers, some of Varnum’s fiercest 
critics have helped to provide it. 
F. Non-retention Campaigns Are More Likely to Succeed When the 
Leaders of the Bar Fail to Respond Quickly and Powerfully 
About a week after Vander Plaats announced in early August 2010 
that he intended to lead a non-retention campaign against the three 
justices, a group of individuals associated with the Iowa State Bar 
Association declared that they were launching IFIC in order to thwart 
Vander Plaats’s ambitions.160  As I have indicated, however, they chose 
to structure IFIC as a tax-exempt organization that could not engage in 
direct advocacy on the justices’ behalf and thus would have to wage a 
more abstract campaign focused on the virtues of judicial impartiality 
and independence.161  But when justices targeted in a non-retention 
campaign do not themselves wish to raise funds and actively campaign to 
keep their seats, the burden of defending them surely falls most heavily 
on leaders of the Bar—attorneys who live and work in the state’s judicial 
                                                     
 159. See supra notes 28–33 and accompanying text. 
 160. See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text. 
 161. See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text. 
PETTYS FINAL 5/14/2011  12:44:21 PM 
2011] THE OUSTER OF THREE JUSTICES 743 
system and who have an ongoing stake in the work of the state’s courts.  
In Iowa, it was not until just three weeks before the November 2010 
election that Fair Courts for Us arrived on the scene, structured in a 
manner that would permit it to advocate explicitly for the justices’ 
retention and carrying cash from the Iowa State Bar Association and the 
Iowa Trial Lawyers Association.162  One does not have to be a 
professional campaign manager to know that three weeks is precious 
little time for a campaign to find traction with voters. 
One is reminded again of the only other occasion in the nation’s 
history when three justices in one state simultaneously lost their retention 
battles.  In the California election of 1986, “the bar associations of San 
Francisco and Beverly Hills were the only sizeable organs of the bar . . . 
that spoke out in support [of the three targeted justices],” and “[t]he Los 
Angeles County Bar Association, the largest bar group in the state, was 
silent.”163  The circumstances in Iowa in 2010 certainly were not 
identical to those in California in 1986—leaders of the Iowa State Bar 
Association did campaign on behalf of the three justices.164  But the 
leaders of the non-retention campaign in Iowa never had to squarely 
confront sustained and pointed opposition from the Bar.165 
G. There Might Be an Inverse Relationship Between the Ease with 
Which Activists Can Place a Proposed Constitutional Amendment 
Before the Voters and the Likelihood that Justices Will Be Targeted 
for Non-retention 
From the point of view of constitutional system design, it bears 
noting that if Iowa’s social conservatives had been able to place a 
proposed constitutional amendment on the ballot without first persuading 
voters to assume all of the risks associated with a constitutional 
convention and without securing the cooperation of the state 
legislature—such as by invoking an initiative process comparable to the 
process that conservatives in California used to place Proposition 8 on 
the 2008 ballot166—the campaign against the Iowa justices might never 
                                                     
 162. See supra notes 98–102 and accompanying text. 
 163. Thompson, supra note 61, at 2040. 
 164. See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text. 
 165. See supra notes 89–106 and accompanying text. 
 166. See Lisa Leff, Gay Marriage Opponents Ready to Submit Petitions, ALAMEDA TIMES-STAR, 
Apr. 22, 2008 (reporting on efforts by opponents of same-sex marriage in California to gather the 
number of signatures necessary to place a proposed constitutional amendment on the ballot). 
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have taken off.167  Once Democrats in the state legislature refused to 
launch the amendment process,168 opposing the justices’ retention was 
the only immediately available way for social conservatives to try to 
undermine the court’s ruling in Varnum.169  Had a citizen-driven route to 
amendment been available, social conservatives might well have 
channeled their energies in that direction.  This is not to say that Iowa 
necessarily ought to permit constitutional amendments through the 
initiative process; it is simply to say that Iowa and other states ought to 
consider these trade-offs when evaluating their approaches to amending 
their constitutions and choosing and retaining their judges.  Justice 
Grodin—one of the three California justices ousted in 1986—has 
provocatively taken this line of reasoning one step further, suggesting 
that when amending a state constitution is as comparatively easy as it is 
in California,170 the case becomes stronger for abandoning judicial 
elections altogether.171 
H. Democratic Constitutionalism Demands Patience and Sustained 
Engagement 
In some of my recent writings, I have joined a handful of other 
scholars in describing and defending our system of democratic 
constitutionalism172—a system in which (as Robert Post and Reva Siegel 
put it) “adjudication is embedded in a constitutional order that regularly 
invites exchange between officials and citizens over questions of 
constitutional meaning.”173  At both the state and federal levels, courts, 
                                                     
 167. See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text (describing the two methods by which the 
Iowa Constitution can be amended).  For a good general discussion of issues relating to the various 
ways in which states permit their constitutions to be amended, see Lutz, supra note 51. 
 168. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 169. See discussion supra notes 51–56 and accompanying text. 
 170. See CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 3 (“The electors may amend the Constitution by initiative.”). 
 171. See Grodin, supra note 140, at 1982.  Yet the case for retention elections does not disappear 
entirely.  When the validity of Proposition 8 (the initiative-driven constitutional amendment banning 
same-sex marriage) was before the California Supreme Court, for example, some observers 
speculated that the justices would trigger retention battles if they declared the proposition invalid.  
See Maura Dolan, Court Is Feeling the Heat on Prop. 8, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2008, at A1. 
 172. See, e.g., Todd E. Pettys, Judicial Discretion in Constitutional Cases, 26 J.L. & POL.  
(forthcoming early 2011); Todd E. Pettys, Popular Constitutionalism and Relaxing the Dead Hand: 
Can the People Be Trusted?, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 313 (2008); Todd E. Pettys, The Vitality of the 
American Sovereign, 108 MICH. L. REV. 939 (2010) (reviewing CHRISTIAN G. FRITZ, AMERICAN 
SOVEREIGNS: THE PEOPLE AND AMERICA’S CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 
(2008)). 
 173. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 379 (2007). 
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politicians, and ordinary citizens engage with one another over time to 
slowly produce judicially endorsed doctrines that reflect the public’s 
well-considered constitutional judgments.  As Barry Friedman writes, 
“[j]udges do not decide finally on the meaning of the Constitution.  
Rather, it is through the dialogic process of ‘judicial decision—popular 
response—judicial re-decision’ that the Constitution takes on the 
meaning it has.”174  The road to constitutional change can thus demand 
great patience, as citizens and their leaders gradually work their way 
toward durable constitutional understandings.  It has been nearly half a 
century since the U.S. Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade,175 for 
example, and the American people still hotly debate precisely where the 
constitutional lines ought to be drawn in the area of abortion. 
In Iowa, the Varnum court powerfully articulated the constitutional 
case for same-sex marriage and for greater protection of gays and 
lesbians against majoritarian discrimination.  Those who disagreed with 
the Varnum court’s conclusions then sent the Iowa Supreme Court a 
powerful message of disapproval.  Same-sex marriage remains 
constitutionally protected in Iowa at the moment, but neither side has yet 
spoken the last word.  In settings ranging from retention elections to 
proposals to amend state constitutions, proponents and opponents of 
same-sex marriage nationwide will continue in their battle to propose the 
synthesis of constitutional values that ultimately wins the acceptance of 
the sovereign citizenry.176  Toward that end in Iowa, those who are proud 
of the court’s ruling in Varnum had better be prepared to fight far more 
wisely and far more effectively than they did in the election of 2010. 
                                                     
 174. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE 
SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 381–82 (2009). 
 175. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 176. Cf. RICHARD J. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 18–19 (2001) (arguing 
that a proposition’s constitutional validity ultimately turns upon its acceptance by the citizenry). 
